Where each part of this site comes from, what the research adds, and what the UNHCR numbers can and cannot show. The Methodology at the bottom explains step by step how the information was processed, with artificial intelligence.
Garcia Arias, Jenny. 2024. “The Demography of Crisis-Driven Outflows from Venezuela.” Population and Development Review 50(3): 643–675 (September 2024). https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12651
Open access under a Creative Commons Attribution License (stated on p. 643). The author is a Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at INED (Paris) and an associate researcher at IIES, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. The study estimates annual outflows from Venezuela by age and sex for 2011–2021 from official counts of Venezuelan-born people in seven main destinations.
| What this site takes from it | Where in the article |
|---|---|
| The timeline figure (rows, markers, dashed periods, dots, phase bands) and the figure note and sources | Figure 1, p. 649 |
| The four periods: precrisis 2011–2013, early phase 2014–2017, socioeconomic upheaval 2018–2020, COVID-19 pandemic 2021 | p. 648 |
| First, second and third emigration waves; 2013 economic controls; 2017 Supreme Court ruling | pp. 647–648, note 1 on p. 669 |
| Hyperinflation, GDP fall and extreme poverty, 2018–2019 | p. 644 |
| Peak outflow in 2018–2019 and the COVID-19 period | pp. 655, 664 |
| Darién Gap and transit caveats used in the Explorer notes | pp. 646, 665–666, 668 |
The background wording you see on the Timeline page follows the article, with citations omitted where marked. The timeline is a redrawn, interactive adaptation: marker positions were read off the printed figure, so dates are approximate. The author name spelled “Rousse” in the article text is “Rousset” in its reference list.
Each row is a finding or statement from the article, with its page. These measure outflows by country of birth, not the UNHCR counts used in the Explorer.
| Finding | Page |
|---|---|
| Total outflow since 2011 is about 5.16 million (95% CI 5.13–5.19), equal to 18% of the estimated 2021 Venezuelan population. About 4.73 million (CI 4.65–4.80) left between 2015 and 2020. | p. 655 |
| Nearly 1.70 million left in 2018–2019, the largest exodus. Nearly 300,000 more crossed between mid-2020 and mid-2021 despite COVID-19 mobility restrictions. | pp. 655, 664 |
| Outflows moved from family migration with many children (precrisis and early phase) to working-age adults, especially ages 15 to 40. In 2019 people aged 50 or older became a significant share, especially older women during the pandemic. | pp. 655, 660 |
| Women’s migration intensity exceeded men’s in every year. The gross migraproduction rate peaked in 2019 at 4.22 for men and 4.74 for women. Men’s larger share in 2014–2018 mostly reflects the composition of the population still in Venezuela. | pp. 658, 662 |
| Boys under 15 were 19.1% of cumulative outflows in 2011–2021, girls 17.6%. | p. 663 |
| Compared with the expected 2021 population, Venezuela has 20% fewer women of reproductive age and 17.8% fewer people aged 15–64. The share aged 60 or older is higher by 8% (men) and 10% (women). | p. 660 |
| Seven destinations (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Mexico, United States, Spain) held about 90% of Venezuelans abroad in April 2022. Their share of Venezuelan-born people abroad rose from 72.1% in 2010 to 94.5% in 2022. | pp. 646, 653 |
| Early emigrants headed mainly to the United States and Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal). Within a decade, outflows of middle- and lower-income Venezuelans headed mainly to Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. | p. 662 |
| Except for Colombia, 90% of displaced Venezuelans remained in the first country they reached. Colombia was a transit country for people heading south on foot. | p. 666 |
| Family migration coincided with relaxed MERCOSUR entry rules. As outflows grew, most recipient countries imposed entry barriers, and the Venezuelan government closed borders and failed to issue valid passports to many citizens. | p. 663 |
| Many Venezuelans now leave the South American countries where they first settled and cross the Darién Gap towards the US border. The author expects these flows to include a large share of children. | pp. 668–669 |
| Return migration is reported as negligible. The study assumes none, and a test with 6% return changed its indicators by under 0.02%. | pp. 665–666 |
| Limits: counts include Venezuelan-born people regardless of legal status, Colombian returnees, and second- and third-generation descendants who may hold Spanish or Colombian citizenship. Returnees to other countries are missing, and people in transit are likely undercounted. | pp. 646, 665–666 |
As given in the note to Figure 1 (p. 649).
Prepared in October 2026.